When Does Resentment Matter? Assessing How Individual Attributes Moderate the Relationship Between Place-Based Resentment and Distrust in Government.

Abstract

Place-based resentment stems from the feeling that a person's community is hard done by. For people who feel it, the facet of their identity tied to this community is perceived as being under threat in some sense. Yet, living in a place is shaped by numerous factors, not least of which is one's economic status (de Lange et al 2022). A low-status individual and a high-status individual may experience life very differently even living in the same place. Should we expect these people to feel place-based resentment in the same way? By extension, would we expect their resentment to affect political behavior in the same way? Our study, based on novel survey data from France (n = 2,085), suggests that in certain contexts the effect of place-based resentment on distrust of government is strongly moderated by respondents' self-reported socio-economic status, as well as their degree of identification with their community.

When Does Resentment Matter? Assessing How Individual Attributes Moderate the Relationship Between Place-Based Resentment and Lack of Trust in Government.

Introduction

Uneven social, economic, and political conditions exist sub-nationally in every country. This variation within countries leads to meaningfully different experiences for the people living in these places. The significance of these differences has long been acknowledged in political science (Lipset & Rokkan 1967, Huntington 1968, Ansell & Samuels 2013). From the perspective of cleavage theory both the rural/urban and center/periphery distinctions were significant enough to be placed alongside other forms of identity such as class and religious denomination as factors that would strongly shape differences between citizens and by extension the politics of a state. Today, the political impact of spatial differences can be seen on electoral maps, particularly when it comes to support for anti-establishment candidates or initiatives, such as the Brexit referendum. It is often the case that rural regions show strong support for these actors and initiatives while urban spaces exhibit higher levels of opposition. Similar divergences can be identified in survey data focused on political attitudes such as trust in government or anti-immigrant sentiment (Munis 2022, Hegewald & Schaff 2022). The structural differences between places have long been theorized to affect politics and society, but how do these differences come to shape the behavior of the individuals who live in these places? Motivated by this question, an emergent literature argues that social identities tied to a person's place of living, place-based identities, are at least partially responsible (Cramer 2016, Taejfel & Turner 1979). Place-based identities emerge because individuals notice the structural differences between places and use the community (or type of community) that they live in as a basis for differentiation. Many of these scholars have come to focus on place-based (or regional) resentment as a form of individual level grievance that is grounded in these place-based identities (Jacobs & Munis 2022).

Place-based resentments are driven by the perception that a person's place has been wronged in some way, be that politically, economically, or socially. Thus, place-based resentment is fundamentally linked to place-based identity. In her landmark conceptualization of place's role in resentment, Cramer (2016) argued that place should be viewed as an additional dimension in an already multidimensional identity, and that the significance of place is determined not just by where an individual lives but by the nature of the life that they lead in that place. This argument implies that the strength or significance of a place-based identity may vary quite substantially from individual to individual. Because of resentment's connection to identity, it follows from this that the significance of place-based resentments may also change depending on an individual's other attributes. The primary aim of this article is to look for evidence of such variation in resentment's effect in France.

Addressing each of the many potential intersectional combinations that Cramer's argument points to is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we choose to focus on how social status,

place-based identity, and the strength of place-based identity affect place-based resentment's effect on distrust in government.[1]

To assess the hypothesized relationships empirically, we gathered novel survey data from France (n = 2,085) and analyzed the effect of a three-way interaction between social status, place-based resentment, and the strength of a person's place-based identity on a respondent's likelihood of indicating a complete lack of trust in government. Distrust in government has been a focus of research on place-based resentment, and as such it is a good starting point for an analysis aimed at understanding how the effect of place-based resentment may differ between individuals (Cramer 2016, Kenny & Luca 2021, McKay et al. 2021, Mitsch et al. 2021, Hegewald 2023, Thompson 2023).

In keeping with the literature, we find evidence that higher levels of place-based resentment increase the probability of a respondent not trusting the government. However, we also find evidence that social status and place-based identity moderate place-based resentment's effect. This is especially true amongst peri-urban respondents, where social status and place-based identity interact to strongly shape the impact of place-based resentment on distrust. This fits with the sociological understanding of peri-urban spaces in France, which are thought to be economically polarized due to status concerns and housing pressure.

The evidence of variation in the effect of place-based resentment associated with social status and identity strength that we present brings important nuance to discussions of how spatial differences are driving anti-system behaviors such as lack of trust in government. From a policy perspective, such nuance is crucial, as divergent behaviors across subpopulations would imply a need for different responses not only between but even within the same community.

The remainder of the article proceeds in three parts, first we provide a brief overview of the political trust and place-based resentment literatures as well as a primer on France's recent economic/geographic history to better contextualize the place identities we analyze, second, we present our analyses, and finally we reflect on the significance of our results for future research.

Trust in Government

In a democratic context, trust is critical to government's functioning, as it determines whether citizens believe that government is acting in their best interest and whether they will support politicians as they take on major term-spanning initiatives (Crozier et al. 1975, Catterberg & Moreno 2006, Listhaug & Jakobsen 2017). An absence of political trust carries a host of implications as the untrusting are more likely to vote for anti-establishment candidates, withdraw from political life entirely, attempt to undermine the government's policies, or even

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[1] We hope that the evidence of variation we offer inspires further investigation of how other facets of identity shape place-based resentment.

support regime alternatives (Devine et al. 2021). Today, evidence is mixed as to whether levels of political trust are generally rising or falling across the world (Offe 1972, Miller 1974, Crozier et al. 1975, Zmerli & van der Meer 2017). However, in France at least, a large proportion of individuals (more than twenty percent of our sample) indicated a complete lack of trust in government. To better understand the potential sources of this distrust, we consult the literature.

From a macro-economic perspective, cross-country analyses have shown that changes in unemployment, economic growth, and budget deficits all affect levels of political trust (van Erkel & van der Meer 2016). Similarly, at an individual level, income and education are positively correlated with political trust (Alesina & La Ferrara 2000, Newton et al. 2018). Other scholars, focusing on the impact of elections, highlight that political trust increases when a person's party of choice wins an election (Anderson et al. 2005) and other scholars have offered evidence that simply participating in elections increases political trust (Essaiason 2011). Socio-culturally speaking, variation in political trust has also been linked to individual ideology as well as to the historical legacy of the region a person lives in (Hooghe et al. 2011, Listhaug & Jakobsen 2018). In our analysis, we incorporate controls to try and account for these factors.

In her analysis of political life in Wisconsin, Cramer (2016) found that political distrust was prevalent amongst rural residents who perceived politicians to favor urban residents. These sentiments, voiced at the individual level, can be tied to a broader structural divergence in the economic condition of rural and urban spaces that has been well documented by economists and geographers (Gordon 2018, Rodriguez-Pose 2018, Iammarino et al. 2019). Recently, scholars have investigated the connection between political trust and place in a number of European contexts, where they have found trust to be dropping in rural and peripheral spaces (Stein et al. 2021, Mitsch et al. 2021, McKay et al. 2021, Kenny & Luca 2021).

While France features as a case in several of the cross-national studies referenced above, the political trust literature has not given it the same attention as a standalone subject. Despite this, France has a famous history of protest, and scholars argue that this reflects strongly articulated class dynamics and a sense of distrust towards the government (Lindvall 2011). This can also be seen today, as analyses of the Yellow Vest movement (*Mouvement des gilets jaunes)* offer evidence that perceived social precarity and low economic status were key catalysts of the wave of protests that swept France in 2018 and 2019 in reaction to rising gas prices. At the same time, others have shown that the geographic distribution of Yellow Vest supporters was not uniform and that individuals in the periphery were more likely to support the movement than those living in urban centers (Boyer 2019). The Yellow Vest movement erupted in reaction to taxes imposed on petrol, making commuting and general travel more expensive for those in rural areas and the urban periphery. The role of place in this reaction is clear, as most of those in the urban core were unbothered by the adjustment. Thus, there is reason to believe that levels of trust may vary across regions in France at least partially because of government's inability to construct policies that are sensitized to the differences in day-to-

day life across France's different regions. Place insensitive policy construction was also found to be a key driver of resentment in the United States (Cramer 2016). If this is true, then place-based resentment may be an important determinant of distrust in government.

As mentioned earlier, trust in government in France serves as our key dependent variable. Respondents were asked to rate their trust in government on a scale ranging from 0 (no trust) to 10 (complete trust). A quick consideration of the distribution of responses across the three place identities of urban, peri-urban, and rural respondents reveals significant zero inflation (Figure 1). We initially attempted to model the distribution using ordinary linear regression and a complete set of explanatory variables, however an examination of predicted outcomes made it clear that we were drastically underestimating the proportion of individuals who indicated that they had no trust at all. The distribution also suggests that individuals are responding to the political trust questions in two ways: first, do they trust political institutions at all, yes or no (the zero/not zero distinction); second, assuming they do trust institutions to some degree, how much do they trust them (all other non-zero values). We have no reason to assume that answers to these two hypothetical questions are driven by the same factors to the same degree. If this is true (and our inability to explain the distribution with a standard OLS approach suggests that it is) then attempting to model both outcomes at the same time will only lead us to capture noisy estimates that fall somewhere between the two causal processes that are presumably at play here. Thus, for both methodological and conceptual reasons we choose to focus on those individuals who indicated a complete lack of trust. This means that our dependent variable is the dichotomous distinction between those who completely distrust government (respondents who answered 0) and those who trust government to some degree (respondents who answered 1 through 10). Because we are primarily interested in examining variance in the effect of place-based resentment, we do not examine the truncated normal distribution of trusting respondents in this paper but do provide an analysis in the appendix for those interested.

Figure 1: Trust in Government Across Place Identities in France

Although the pattern of zero-inflation is consistent amongst rural, urban, and peri-urban respondents, the individuals in these often starkly different places live substantively different lives. The disparate impact of the petrol tax that incited the Yellow Vest movement is a good

example. By extension, they also have different interactions with government. Consequently, it is possible that even though we see similar distributions across place identities, the factors that drive individuals to distrust government in these spaces might be different. If this is true, then the role that place-based resentment plays in shaping distrust across these different respondent samples may also vary.

Place-Based Resentment

The salience of place-based differences (e.g. the rural-urban/center-periphery divide) holds a distinguished place in structuralist explanations of politics. Yet it is also growing increasingly salient amongst those who adopt a more behavioralist approach, marked by the emergent literature on the topic (McKay et al 2021, Trujillo 2022). In recent years, many scholars have written on the variance that exists in political behavior between regions (Jennings & Stoker 2016, Rodríguez-Pose 2018, Wuthnow 2018, Maxwell 2019, 2020, Haffert 2021, Harteveld et al. 2021) and others have also conceptualized these differences as a clash between cosmopolitan and parochial groups, which is grounded in the cultural change centered in globalized, urban spaces (Kriesi et al. 2012, De Wilde et al. 2019, Ford & Jennings 2020). The place-based resentment literature aims to add to this discussion by understanding the role that individuals' awareness of and engagement with the tensions between regions plays in changing political behaviors.

A cornerstone of this resentment-focused literature is the work of Katherine Cramer (2016), who develops the idea of 'rural consciousness' to explain how resentment operates in the United States. She defines the term as:

> "… an identity as a rural person that includes much more than an attachment to a place. It includes a sense that decision makers routinely ignore rural places and fail to give rural communities their fair share of resources, as well as a sense that rural folks are fundamentally different from urbanites in terms of lifestyles, values, and work ethic. Rural consciousness signals an identification with rural people and places and denotes a multifaceted resentment against cities." (Cramer 2016, p.26)

From this perspective, 'rural consciousness' denotes resentment grounded in a multidimensional identity, rather than a simple identification with a place. Resentment appears when individuals harbor grievances over perceived injustice or mistreatment (Capelos & Demertzis 2018). Efforts to explain such unfair treatment can coalesce into narratives, which offer explanations as to why outgroups benefit while ingroups suffer. Cramer's study of resentment in Wisconsin (2016) suggests that these narratives are discursively constructed, malleable, and varied depending upon individual experiences.

Cramer also found that, at least in the case of Wisconsin, rural consciousness was multidimensional. It drew on racial, economic, and social facets of identity, which overlap in the contrast between rural and urban settings in the northern interior of the United States. Furthering this complexity, Munis (2020) found that the political implications of place-based

resentment differed across partisan lines as well, indicating that political preferences also shape the significance of resentment.

In Wisconsin, the geographic distinction of the rural-urban divide became the central fault line of political conflict in the state, as it has in most of the United States and in many parts of Europe (based on maps of election results). Yet Cramer is quick to point out that even within rural spaces, there are those who are perceived as being urban. In rural contexts, which are largely racially homogenous, the key distinguisher is class, which itself is determined by a host of factors. While living in a particular place may leave a person more predisposed to resentment, the impact of this resentment will depend on their experiences. For a low-income individual living in a rural space, with a strong attachment to their community, a narrative of resentment in which wealthy urbanites take advantage of rural residents may ring truer than it does for their wealthy neighbor with less attachment to their place of living. For one, the narrative is an explanation for an inequality that powerfully shapes their existence, for the other, it may simply be the invocation of a social truism. To reiterate, the specific consequences of place-based resentment may be meaningfully different for different sections of society, even if they live in the same place. We would argue that this is true for any behavior shaped by identity, as there will always be those who, by dint of occupation, income, cultural background, or some other facet of identity, find themselves separated from the common experience.[2]

Thus, we argue that it is necessary to account for the multidimensional character of a person's identity to understand the impact of their place-based resentment. While we understand that place-based resentment diminishes trust (Cramer 2016, Thompson 2023), we do not have a clear picture of how this dynamic differs across varying levels of social status or place-based identity. Assessing this variation is the principal contribution of this article.

Figure 2 presents the distribution of our place-based resentment index across the three place-based identities in our French sample.[3] Place-based resentment in France is clearly concentrated differently across place-based identities, with rural respondents exhibiting much higher levels of resentment, urban respondents expressing more mixed views, and peri-urban respondents falling somewhere in-between. Because of the importance of context in shaping resentment, it is necessary to consider the differences between France's regions in further detail.

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[2] It is important to note that rural places do not have a monopoly on resentment, indeed the notion of rural consciousness as developed by Cramer is meant to be an example of the kind of worldview that can effectively channel resentment. As such, theoretically, place need not play a key role in shaping resentful worldviews. It is the case, however, that economic inequalities between places are some of the most profound in modern societies, and these economic differences are often further compounded by social and cultural differences, which make them an incredibly potent basis for differentiation.

[3] The specific operationalization of our resentment score is discussed in the data section.

Figure 2: Place-Based Resentment Across Place-Based Identities

Place in France

France is generally recognized as having strong place-based divides. The country is dominated economically by Paris and other major metropolitan areas. The broader Île-de-France region, home to Paris, contributes just shy of one-third of the country's GDP and is home to just over eighteen percent of France's population. This means that nearly one in five French people live in Paris. As a broader coalition, the major urban centers of France account for more than half of its population and the great majority of its GDP. These spaces also exhibit higher levels of inequality than other parts of the country (Kramarz et al 2022). In addition to this, France's cities are also much more ethnically and racially diverse.

Today, roughly twenty-one percent of France's population are either immigrants or are the children of immigrants. While older generations of immigrants were commonly from other European countries, most immigrants today are from North and West Africa. In France, immigrants concentrate in urban spaces. In Seine-Sant-Denis, a department in the north-east of Paris, more than thirty-percent of the population has an immigrant background. By contrast, in more rural parts of France, this number is frequently as low as three percent. Thus, when we think about the conflict driven by racial, ethnic, and religious tensions, which have been a prominent feature in France's political life, we must remember that these are primarily conflicts taking place in urban France. For example, the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting and its fallout, the riots against racial discrimination and police brutality in 2005, the general economic destitution of the banlieues, and the French government's bans on face veils, were all centered in urban spaces.

What does this mean for urban place-based identity in France? Scholars of social identity theory argue that group homogeneity and stability are good for identity construction (Cramer 2004). Urban France today is dynamic and highly heterogeneous both economically and socially. Thus, it is unlikely that a strong, singular place identity would arise in urban contexts, the social fabric of these spaces is too varied and changes too frequently to serve as a strong basis for identification. Indeed, given the complexity of urban existence it seems likely that a single city could contain multiple place-based identities, which might be bound to specific neighborhoods or complicated by ethnic, racial, or economic differences. Recognizing this, we assume that

place-based resentment will have little to no effect in urban spaces and what effect it does have will likely be strongly shaped by social status. The histogram in figure 2B highlights that levels of place-based resentment are generally much lower in urban spaces. While this may indicate that urban identifying respondents are generally less resentful, it seems more likely that resentments held by urban identifying respondents are not framed in terms of place. Because we are interested in exploring variation in the effects of place-based resentment across rural, urban, and peri-urban identities, we do not address this complexity, but future analyses are warranted to explore the dynamics of resentment (place-based or otherwise) in urban spaces in greater detail.

Despite the clear salience of urban centers in economic terms, population growth in these spaces has slowed (Jousseaume & Talandier 2016). Housing prices in urban areas have continued to rise and many now live in the surrounding suburbs and exurbs (peri-urban spaces), either by choice or out of necessity (Reynard 2016, Guilluy 2019). Individuals who work in urban spaces are now forced to commute. This creates a new tension between urban regions and the peri-urban places that have become home to those who can no longer afford to live in the urban center (Bruneau et al. 2018). Thus, for some, moving to a peri-urban space is/was a negative thing. However, for a long time peri-urban places carried the opposite connotation. At least initially, these in-between spaces were meant to emulate the suburbs of the United States, a place (and to some extent a social category) that individuals could graduate into as they moved up the economic ladder. The idealized peri-urban lifestyle involves a stand-alone home, an automobile, and more immediate access to the countryside, for those who could afford the extravagance. In the seventies, the French government made financing accessible for both home and automobile ownership, to make it all more attainable. Government policies also sought to foster economic activity in these spaces to make them more attractive targets for internal migration (Cusin et al. 2016). For some time at least, these communities became aspirational, a place to move to once you were ready to graduate economically from the banlieue.[4] From this perspective, membership in the peri-urbanity was a positive thing, to be peri-urban was to have "made it out" (Girard 2012). However, the urban housing crisis has continued to escalate (Le Gales & Pierson 2019) and at least since the 2000s French sociologists have described peri-urban neighborhoods as spaces that lower class individuals are forced into as they are priced out of major cities (Guilluy 2010, 2015). Thus, the peri-urbanity presents a contradiction, it is simultaneously an aspirational space which marks the economic mobility of the wealthiest members of the working class while also being the site of great resentment over the endangerment of that same economic mobility (Girard & Riviere 2013). Contemporary work on the matter suggests that peri-urban neighborhoods today are a mix of individuals from both conditions, which implies a psychologically volatile space in which the classic force of relative deprivation may be particularly potent (Gurr 1970).

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[4] The poorer, working class residential areas of France's major urban centers.

We, therefore, expect social status to strongly moderate the effect of resentment amongst peri-urban respondents, as individuals who are better off economically are more likely to identify with the longstanding notion of peri-urban spaces as a place for the relatively affluent and are thus less likely to be affected by their resentment as a consequence of both their own personal economic condition and their association with this positive ingroup. For those who are not well off, we expect resentment towards urban spaces to be strongly associated with their trust in government. From a theoretical perspective, for those who perceive themselves to be of lower social status, living in a space associated with economic success is likely to lead to negative upward comparisons and to promote resentment. The emergent tensions in peri-urban spaces directly connect to the management of the housing crisis in urban spaces in France, which could lead to a reduction of trust in government and to a resentment against the spaces that are "causing" the problem. Strength of place identity may also moderate resentment in peri-urban contexts, however it is more likely that those who feel they do not belong in these affluent communities (and thus have weaker place identities) are more likely to be affected by their resentment.

Beyond France's peri-urban spaces lie the rural areas, the home of 'la France profonde', which translates roughly to 'the real France'. It is where the vineyards and quaint villages portrayed in French tourism ads can be found (Chamboredon 1980, Dubost 1998, Rogers 2013). This version of France defines itself in contradistinction to urban spaces (and especially Paris), and by comparison is less dynamic both economically and socially, much less densely populated, and considerably more homogenous (Bruneau et al 2018). Since the early 2000s at least, rural France has also been distinguished by its support for the anti-system National Rally (once National Front) party, which many scholars have interpreted as a sign of significant resentment in these spaces (Brookes & Cappellina 2023). The relative lack of opportunities in rural France leads younger people to move to urban or peri-urban spaces where they can find career opportunities, causing the population of rural spaces to grow both older and smaller over time. This is especially true for lower-class individuals, whose social mobility is restricted by being far away from the best opportunities. Thus, scholars of rural life have argued that social status is a key element to understanding the variety of rural experiences in France (Mischi & Renahy 2008). However, in France, the dynamic is less pronounced than in places like Eastern Germany or the United States, where depopulation is severe. The centralized French state transfers large sums of money from Paris and other key urban areas to more peripheral spaces, and the French government also advocates for funding for rural spaces at the supranational, EU level through measures such as the Common Agricultural Policy. Thus, while there are certainly still grounds for economic resentment in rural spaces in France, this is perhaps less the case than it is elsewhere (Brookes & Cappellina 2023). In addition to these contemporary tensions, there is a long legacy of cultural conflict between rural and urban spaces in France, that stretches back into the 19th century when the regularization of the language and the industrialization of the state set Paris and other key urban centers against the countryside (Weber 1976, Tilly 1979). Other scholars have seen rural culture as being in existential conflict with urban spaces during

both the interwar and postwar periods (Wright 1964, Morin 1967). In each instance, scholars have argued that French "peasants" have disappeared, joining the homogenized ranks of "Frenchmen". While it may be true today that language differences have largely disappeared and incomes in rural spaces are not drastically different from elsewhere, the distinctiveness of the countryside remains an important part of French culture (Rogers 1987, Demossier 2011). For these reasons, we expect place-based identities to form more easily in rural spaces, where society is less differentiated, slower to change, and has historically viewed itself as distinct from France's urban core. We expect that lower social status and a stronger rural identity will both augment the effect of resentment on trust in government for rural identifying respondents.

Table 1 provides a more succinct synopsis of our expectations:

Table 1

Place Identity	Place-Based Resentment will have…	Social Status	Strength of Place-Based Identity
Rural	… a strong effect, reducing trust because of economic and cultural tensions with urban spaces.	Lower social status will strengthen resentment's effect.	Stronger place-based identity will strengthen resentments' effect, as a strong rural identity will likely heighten awareness of structural and historical divides.
Urban	… no effect or a weak effect because of social and economic diversity and the dominance of urban spaces.	Lower social status will strengthen resentment's effect.	Place-based identity will not have an identifiable effect because diversity in urban spaces complicates identity formation. This could lead to weaker or multiple identities which will make identification difficult.
Peri-urban	… a strong effect, reducing trust because of the forced arrival of urban dwellers who can no longer afford to live there and associated difficulties.	Lower social status will strengthen resentment's effect.	A stronger place-based identity will weaken resentment's effect, as peri-urban identity is associated with economic success.

Data and Variables

Our analysis includes 2,085 respondents from across France, with 933 urban identifying respondents, 785 rural identifying respondents, and 360 peri-urban identifying respondents.[5] The resentment and identity strength indices that we use as key variables are based on sets of items that align with the measurement of the concepts in the extant literature on place-based identity and resentment. The item sets load strongly onto their respective factors, each with a

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[5] For more details on the collection process, including ethical concerns please see the supplementary material.

Cronbach's alpha over .8. The full text for each of the items can be found in appendices A and B. In the broader literature, place-based resentment is sometimes conceptualized as having three dimensions, power (relating to representation and relation to government), resources, and respect. In this work we focus on the power dimension, which is most theoretically relevant for a discussion of trust in government.

Our results focus on our variables of interest, however the full regression tables can be found in our supplementary materials, specifically in Appendix D.

Table 2 – Key Variables

Variable	Operationalization
No Trust in Government	Dichotomous Variable
Place-based Identity	3 part categorical (Rural, Urban, Peri-urban)
Place-based Resentment	Index constructed from 6 item single factor CFA
Identity Strength	Index constructed from 5 item single factor CFA
Social Status	Ordinal Variable (0-10)

In addition to these variables of interest, we also include a set of controls presented in Table 3. The controls we have selected are informed by the literature (discussed at length in the earlier sections) and aim to account for confounding effects both at the individual and ecological level.

Table 3 – Control Variables

Variable	Level	Operationalization
Age	Individual	Set of 3 dummy variables, 18-35 years as reference
Gender	Individual	Dummy variable, male as reference
College Education	Individual	Dummy variable, no bachelor's as reference
Unemployed	Individual	Dummy variable, employed as reference
Retired	Individual	Dummy variable, not retired as reference
Non-Citizen	Individual	Dummy variable, citizen as reference
Catholic	Individual	Dummy variable, non-Catholic as reference
Left-Right Position	Individual	Ordinal variable (0-10) (Smooth term)
Government Supporter	Individual	Dummy variable, vote for President's party as reference
Objective Place of Living	Commune	Set of 3 dummy variables based on government (DEGURBA) classification, urban as reference
Median Household Income	Commune	Continuous variable
Access to Healthcare	Commune	Continuous variable
Proportion of 75+ year olds living alone	Commune	Continuous variable
Department Intercept	Department	Random Intercept at Department Level

Analysis

Our analysis aims to better understand individuals who indicated that they have no trust in government. The histograms presented earlier (Figure 1) highlight the strongly zero-inflated character of the trust in government distribution. Over twenty percent of respondents voice no trust for government, in rural spaces this number exceeds twenty-five percent. Performing a standard OLS with trust in government as a continuous dependent variable leads to significant underestimation of the proportion of 'no trust' individuals. This suggests that there is something distinct about the causal process at work driving the trust/no trust distinction that must be modeled separately. Moreover, we are especially interested in those with no trust in government because extant research suggests that these individuals are more likely to hold anti-democratic views and vote for radical parties (Geurkink et al. 2020). Thus, we opt for logistic regression to focus on the some-trust/no-trust dichotomy.[6]

To allow for the complex relationship between identity, resentment, and social status proposed by Cramer, our model centers on a three-way interaction between these three variables. The interaction term is necessary because the intersectional theory driving our investigation assumes that our variables of interest will not act on distrust of government independently but will instead be influenced by one another. Additionally, we treat this interaction as a random-effect, which is allowed to vary across the three place identity categories (rural, urban, and peri-urban). This is another theoretically salient modeling decision, as we do not assume that resentment or identity will operate in the same way across the three different respondent groups.

The results presented in the next section focus solely on the impact of our variables of interest. To examine the controls please see the appendix, where the regression tables are presented in full. Our models are specified using the 'rstanarm' package in R, which employs regularizing priors that are automatically scaled to match each variable.

Results

The key results of our analysis are presented in Figure 3 below where we present the main effects[7] and interaction terms for the three-way interaction. Our model provides an independent set of estimates for urban, peri-urban, and rural respondents. The only consistent

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[6] For the sake of space, we omit a consideration of the full distribution in this article, however, for those who are interested we include the results of the linear regression analyses of the zero-truncated distributions in the supplementary material.

[7] Main effects refer to the terms representing the effect of each of the component variables but not the interactions. In our model these terms present the effect of each variable when the other variables are at 0 (which in our case means at their mean because we standardized them). In Figure 3 they are "Social status", "Identity Strength" and "Place-based resentment".

effect across all three groups is place-based resentment, which increases the probability of distrust in government for all respondents.

For urban and rural respondents the main effect of social status is negative, indicating that lower social-status individuals in these groups are more likely to distrust government. Amongst peri-urban respondents, the main effect of social status is non-significant, however, the significant interaction effects indicate that social status's effect is bound to identity strength and place-based resentment. The combination of interactions amongst peri-urban respondents means that individuals who do not identify with their communities and feel that they are lower social status are *especially* likely to distrust government. It is also worth noting that the same interaction effects are significant in the same way for urban respondents, though they are considerably weaker.

**Figure 3 – Key Variable Coefficient Plot**

Identity strength has a negative effect for both urban and peri-urban respondents, indicating that those who feel closer to their communities are less likely to distrust government. Interestingly, evidence for the effect of strength of place-based identity in rural spaces is inconclusive, although both the social status and place-based resentment interactions almost meet the threshold of significance.

For rural respondents, the only terms from the interaction that have a significant effect on trust in government are the main effects for place-based resentment (increasing distrust) and social status (decreasing distrust). It is difficult to assess the scale of the effects we have identified by only looking at the logistic coefficient and it is also difficult to understand the impact of the interactions. For this reason, in figures 4, 5, and 6 below we sample from the posterior of our model to produce predicted probabilities at different levels of resentment, social status, and identity strength, for each group of respondents.

The graphs presented below simplify things by highlighting how changes in place-based resentment, identity strength, and social status affect the probability of a respondent indicating that they do not trust government. All variables are standardized and are presented in terms of standard deviations from the mean: -1 (1 standard deviation below the mean), 0 (the mean), and 1 (1 standard deviation above the mean).[8] For the purposes of the predictions presented below, we hold all controls constant or at their reference values and use the baseline intercept. [9] The red dashed line in each plots marks the average rate of indicating no trust in government amongst respondents from the relevant place-identity group.

Figure 4 – Probability of Distrust in Government Amongst Rural Respondents

The y-axis represents the probability of a person indicating that they distrust government. The x-axis represents different levels of place-based resentment. Each plot has two lines, bounded by ninety percent confidence intervals.[10] The solid line represents a hypothetical individual who indicated their social status was one standard deviation below the mean. The dashed line represents another hypothetical individual who indicated that their social status was one standard deviation above the mean. Each figure is composed of three plots (A, B, and C) which reflect three different potential levels of place-based identity strength: A – one standard deviation below the mean; B – the mean; and C – one standard deviation above the mean. Thus, the slope of each of the lines in each of the charts represents the effect of place-based

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[8] For those interested, we include cross tabulations of our interaction variables in the appendix.

[9] A partially pooled random intercept is composed of a base-line intercept and sub-sample adjustments, none of which were significant in our case (see the appendix). So, the baseline is generally applicable. The baseline intercept represents the base probability of a respondent indicating no trust in government, when all continuous variables are held at zero (the mean for standardized variables) and all binary variables are held at their reference value.

[10] Findings where p <.1 are frequently reported in social sciences and we use the 90% confidence interval to highlight all effects that at least meet this threshold.

resentment for a hypothetical individual with some combination of social status and place-based identity strength.[11]

Examining the effects for rural respondents in Figure 4, the slope of both the dashed and solid lines tell us that resentment's effect is positive and significant for individuals with average or relatively strong identity strength (figures 4B and 4C). To assess resentment's effect we look to see whether the upper confidence interval on the left side of the x-axis, say at x = -0.5, is lower than the lower confidence interval on the right side of the axis, at x = 1, for example. In graphs 4B and 4C we can see that this is clearly the case. So, not only is the effect of place-based resentment statistically significant, as we saw in the coefficient plots, but it also has a meaningful effect on the probability of a respondent indicating that they distrust government. This is not always the case, as statistically significant effects can translate to relatively flat slopes that do not strongly impact the probability of our outcome of interest. Plotting predicted probabilities allows us to easily assess the scale of our effects.

We can also see, based on the small space between the lines in figure 4C, that the effect of social status is significant as well. Those who perceive themselves as having lower social status and who feel higher levels of place-based resentment are more likely to distrust government. Interestingly, for those with weak place-based identity both distinctions disappear. While the coefficients for place-based identity and its interactions are not significant, they produce enough noise to make the effect of resentment and social status non-significant when identity is weak. We would not have easily been able to identify this dynamic without plotting the predicted probabilities, an advantage of this approach.

The same set of relationships is presented for urban-identifying respondents in Figure 5. In this case we can see that while the probability of distrusting the government remains relatively high, place-based resentment does not strongly influence this outcome. Lower social status individuals are genearlly more strongly affected by resentment but the effect remains weak. As identity strength increases, the probability of indicating no trust in government decreases, but the shift is only meaningful for lower social status individuals. To see this, note that the solid line in 5A is higher at all points than the solid line in 5C, the dashed lines in the same figure overlap along the entire x-axis. Relatively high status individuals who identify as living in an urban space are generally less likely to indicate distrust of government.

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[11] When comparing two lines or comparing two different points on the same line it is helpful to think of the lines/points as representing two different hypothetical individuals. One can compare any of the lines in a figure to any of the lines in the same figure to assess the impact of place-based resentment, social status, or place-based identity.

Figure 5 – Probability of Distrust in Government Amongst Urban Respondents

The results for peri-urban respondents are presented in Figure 6. In this figure we see that resentment has a very strong effect but only amongst individuals who see themselves as lower social status and who have weak to average identity strength. Amongst higher social status peri-urban individuals, and those who strongly identify with their peri-urban identity, resentment has no effect.

Figure 6 – Probability of Distrust in Government Amongst Peri-Urban Respondents

Discussion

We turn now to how these results match our expectations. Place-based resentment operates in the expected direction (higher resentment leads to higher rates of distrust) and so does social status (lower status leads to higher rates of distrust). As expected, place-based resentment does not have a strong effect amongst urban respondents. By contrast, the place-based identity results were more complicated. Our analysis reveals significant negative impacts of place-based identity on both urban and peri-urban low social status participants, while no such effect is observed in rural areas. This indicates that urban and peri-urban residents with a strong sense of place identity tend to maintain trust in government, irrespective of their level of resentment. Conversely, in rural areas, a strong sense of place identity does not offer the same buffer against distrust in government. This differential suggests a unique dynamic at play in rural regions, where place-based resentment may be more deeply intertwined with the fabric of local identity, as opposed to urban and peri-urban settings. Such findings align with the

historical context of rural regions often finding themselves at a disadvantage in the rural-urban divide, suggesting that resentment could be a more integral component of rural identity narratives than it is for those in urban or peri-urban areas. More research is required to assess these possibilities.

Our findings indicate that place-based resentment in peri-urban spaces is particularly potent for individuals who are of low social status and do not identify with their communities. The probability of distrust of government was also high in urban and rural spaces, but the effect of place-based resentment was sharpest for these individuals. Given the distinctive behavior of this subgroup, it would be useful to know more about them. To offer additional insight, we provide a comparison of the differences between low-identity, low-status peri-urban individuals and the rest of the peri-urban sample in terms of both demographics and answers to key policy questions.

Table 4 – Comparing low-identity and low-status peri-urbanites to other peri-urbanites

	Periurban (n = 293)	Periurban Low Identity & Low Status (n =67)	T-test Sig.
Demographic Proportions			
Education	36%	22%	**
Male	43%	48%	
Catholic	62%	43%	***
Employed	49%	51%	
Retired	44%	31%	**
Average Age	55 Years	53 Years	
Vote Choice			
Renaissance Vote (Government Party)	23%	8%	***
Raissemblement National (Far Right Party)	25%	33%	
La France Insoumise (Far Left Party)	6%	21%	***
Europe Ecologie Les Verts (Green Party)	5%	10%	
Average Policy Responses			
Left Right Self Placement (0 = Left, 10 = Right)	5.8	5.3	
Should Incomes be More Equal? (0 = More Equal, 10 = Less Equal)	5.1	3.9	***
Increase Fossil Fuel Taxes? (0 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree)	2.8	2.1	***
How fair is the income distribution? (1 = Very Fair, 5 = Very Unfair)	3.5	3.8	***
Average Immigration Attitude Responses			
There are too many immigrants around my place (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree)	3.0	3.0	
Should immigration be limited? (0 = Should be	2.7	2.5	

limited, 10 = immigration should be easier)			
Average Satisfaction with Local Services (1 = Very Dissatisfied, 5 = Very Satisfied)			
Health	3.8	3.4	***
Education	3.9	3.8	
Culture & Recreation	3.6	3.4	
Public Transport	3.3	2.8	***
Groceries	4.0	3.7	*

Our comparisons offer additional insight into the section of the peri-urban population that is particularly moved by its place-based resentment. We find that they are typically less educated, more likely to be secular, and are less likely to be retired. On average, they are also more likely to believe that the income distribution is unfair and that incomes should be more equal. They are also more likely to oppose increasing taxes on fossil fuels, which fits with the higher levels of engagement with the yellow vest movement in peri-urban areas (Boyer 2019). Additionally, we find that they are much less likely to support the governing party (Renaissance) and are significantly more likely to support the far-left 'La France Insoumise'. It is worth noting that these respondents are not, at least based on these rudimentary t-tests, more likely to support the far-right and are not more likely to hold anti-immigrant attitudes. These descriptive statistics offer very tentative evidence that a stronger place-based resentment effect in peri-urban areas is associated with left-wing rather than right-wing populism.

Table 5 – Comparing low-identity and low-status urbanites to the rest of the subsample

	Urban (n = 757)	Low Identity & Low Status (n =176)	T-test Sig.
Demographic Proportions			
Education	39%	22%	**
Male	44%	49%	
Catholic	52%	43%	*
Employed	49%	51%	
Retired	37%	27%	*
Average Age	51 Years	46 Years	***
Vote Choice			
Renaissance Vote (Government Party)	19%	12%	*
Raissemblement National (Far Right Party)	22%	25%	
La France Insoumise (Far Left Party)	12%	18%	*
Europe Ecologie Les Verts (Green Party)	8%	7%	
Average Policy Responses			
Left Right Self Placement (0 = Left, 10 = Right)	5.4	4.9	*
Should Incomes be More Equal? (0 = More Equal, 10	4.7	3.9	***

= Less Equal)			
Increase Fossil Fuel Taxes? (0 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree)	2.9	2.9	
How fair is the income distribution? (1 = Very Fair, 5 = Very Unfair)	3.6	3.8	**
Average Immigration Attitude Responses			
There are too many immigrants around my place (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree)	3.1	3.3	
Should immigration be limited? (0 = Should be limited, 10 = immigration should be easier)	3.2	3.3	
Average Satisfaction with Local Services (1 = Very Dissatisfied, 5 = Very Satisfied)			
Health	3.8	3.5	***
Education	4.0	3.7	***
Culture & Recreation	3.9	3.6	**
Public Transport	3.9	3.8	
Groceries	4.2	4.0	**

As a point of comparison, we provide an equivalent table for the low-status and low-identity respondents from urban spaces. The results of this assessment suggest a somewhat similar profile, but with a few key distinctions. Compared to others urban identifying individuals, low-identity/low-status urbanites are less educated, more likely to be secular, and are typically younger. Likewise, while they are more likely to believe that France's income distribution is unfair and that incomes should be more equal, they are *not* more likely to oppose fossil fuel taxes being increased, indeed they exhibit the exact same level of support as the rest of the subsample. Additionally, low-identity/low-status urbanites are not especially dissatisfied with local transport. These last two points seem particularly important when one considers that individuals with similar status and identity strength levels in peri-urban spaces stood out as being especially dissatisfied with transport and more likely to oppose raising prices on gas. It may be the case that these concerns over access to transport and rising gas prices, which are particularly salient for those in the periphery of urban areas, may help to explain the strength of place-based resentment's effect on distrust in government in peri-urban spaces. If this is the case, it reinforces Cramer's argument that place-insensitive legislation may drive resentment and distrust in government in peripheral regions (Cramer 2016). More research is needed to explore this possibility further.

Conclusion

To summarize, amongst rural respondents, place-based resentment was a generally important determinant of distrust, but not when identity strength was low. Amongst peri-urban respondents, the regions where socio-economic tensions are highest, we see a large difference in the effect of resentment based on social status, but only when identity was low. In urban spaces, place-based resentment affected political trust, but was not moderated by identity strength or social status in the same way. At the same time, in urban spaces we saw a significant interaction between identity strength and social status, which indicated that those who see themselves as low social status and disconnected from their communities were especially likely to distrust government. This same dynamic was present in peri-urban spaces but is further compounded by a strengthening of place-based resentment's effect for similar individuals. What we find suggests that place-based resentment's effect differs between places (comparing rural to urban for instance) but can also differ within communities (comparing low-identity and low-status peri-urban individuals to the rest of the community). If such variance can be found in the connection between place-based resentment and distrust in government, it seems possible that it might exist for other important political behavior outcomes as well. If this is true, then work seeking to understand the impact of place-based resentment elsewhere will need to carefully consider how the effect they are aiming to identify might vary across important demographic and structural divides. For example, work needs to be done to explore how factors such as race in the United States or the East-West divide in Germany shape the effect of place-based resentment. While the findings here speak directly to the place-based resentment literature, the same concern over variation in effects could be extended to any part of political behavior. Such research would take the empirical implications of an argument for an intersectional understanding of identity seriously. Typically, we treat different facets of identity as a series of terms to be individually added to a regression in such a way that factors like social status and place identity or race and gender are independent. This explicitly denies the possibility of intersectional dynamics. Incorporating moderation terms with greater frequency will allows us to entertain the possibility that at least two or three factors influence one another to shape political behavior.

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Appendix A – Place Based Identity Strength Questions

PCA revealed that the variables listed below all loaded strongly onto a single dimension, we took the average of the five questions to construct our index.

	1. Strongly agree	2. Somewhat agree	3. Neither agree nor disagree	4. Somewhat disagree	5. Strongly disagree	99. Don't know/No answer
[core_consc_1] **Q5.** The term [ingroup] resident is a good description of how I see myself.	1	2	3	4	5	99
[core_consc_2] **Q6.** Being a [ingroup] resident is very important to me.	1	2	3	4	5	99
[core_consc_3] **Q7.** When I meet someone who lives in an [ingroup] area, I feel connected.	1	2	3	4	5	99
[core_consc_4] **Q8.** I have similar values to other people living in [ingroup] areas.	1	2	3	4	5	99
[core_consc_5] **Q9.** I have a lot in common with other people living in [ingroup] areas.	1	2	3	4	5	99

Appendix B – Place Based Resentment Questions

PCA revealed that the variables listed below all loaded strongly onto a single dimension, we took the average of the six questions to construct our index.

|	1. Strongly agree	2. Somewhat agree	3. Neither agree nor disagree	4. Somewhat disagree	5. Strongly disagree	99. Don't know/No answer
[core_consc_6] **Q10.** Politicians don't care what people living in [ingroup] areas think.	1	2	3	4	5	99
[core_consc_7] **Q11.** Elites look down on people living in [ingroup] areas.	1	2	3	4	5	99
[core_consc_8] **Q12.** People living in [ingroup] areas have no say in what the government does.	1	2	3	4	5	99
[core_consc_9] **Q13.** There are too many MPs from [outgroup] areas who do not represent the interests of people living in [ingroup] areas.	1	2	3	4	5	99
[core_consc_10] **Q14.** Politicians ignore the issues that really matter in [ingroup] areas.	1	2	3	4	5	99
[core_consc_11] **Q15.** [Ingroup] areas are not represented enough in the media.	1	2	3	4	5	99

Appendix C – Main Analysis Full Regression Results

Figure C1 – Logistic Regression Full Results

Parameter	Rhat	n_eff	mean	sd	2.5%	50%	97.5%
(Intercept)	1.0	566	-1.2	0.4	-2.0	-1.2	-0.2
Left-Right Self Placement	1.0	2817	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5
Age	1.0	2408	-0.1	0.1	-0.3	-0.1	0.1
Bachelor Degree	1.0	3296	-0.1	0.2	-0.4	-0.1	0.2
Gender (Female = 1)	1.0	2760	-0.2	0.1	-0.4	-0.2	0.1
Unemployed	1.0	3265	-0.3	0.3	-0.9	-0.3	0.3
Retired	1.0	2449	0.1	0.2	-0.3	0.1	0.5
Renaissance Vote	1.0	2388	-3.0	0.5	-4.0	-3.0	-2.2
Catholic	1.0	4033	-0.2	0.1	-0.4	-0.2	0.1
Noncitizen	1.0	3128	-0.9	0.5	-2.1	-0.9	0.0
Administrative ID: Urban	1.0	1787	-0.2	0.2	-0.6	-0.2	0.2
Administrative ID: Peri-Urban	1.0	1949	-0.0	0.2	-0.4	-0.0	0.3
% 75+ Living Alone	1.0	3649	0.1	0.1	-0.0	0.1	0.2
Median Income	1.0	2598	0.1	0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.2
Distance To Doctor	1.0	3196	0.1	0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.2
Urban - Intercept	1.0	499	0.1	0.4	-0.7	0.1	0.9
Urban - Social Status	1.0	2279	-0.3	0.1	-0.5	-0.3	-0.1
Urban - Identity Strength	1.0	2494	-0.6	0.2	-0.9	-0.6	-0.3
Urban - Place-Based Resentment	1.0	2251	0.6	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.8
Urban - Social Status : Identity Strength	1.0	2135	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.5
Urban - Social Status : Place-based Resentment	1.0	1749	-0.2	0.1	-0.4	-0.2	0.1
Urban - Place-based Resentment : Identity Strength	1.0	1923	0.0	0.1	-0.2	0.0	0.3
Urban - Resentment : Identity Strength : Social Status	1.0	2203	-0.1	0.1	-0.3	-0.1	0.1
Rural - Intercept	1.0	480	-0.4	0.4	-1.3	-0.3	0.4
Rural - Social Status	1.0	2018	-0.6	0.1	-0.9	-0.6	-0.4
Rural - Identity Strength	1.0	1758	-0.2	0.2	-0.7	-0.2	0.2
Rural - Place-Based Resentment	1.0	2203	1.0	0.2	0.7	1.0	1.4
Rural - Social Status : Identity Strength	1.0	2235	-0.2	0.2	-0.6	-0.2	0.1
Rural - Social Status : Place-Based Resentment	1.0	1983	0.1	0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.4
Rural - Place-Based Resentment : Identity Strength	1.0	1480	0.3	0.2	-0.1	0.3	0.7
Rural - Resentment : Identity Strength : Social Status	1.0	2045	0.1	0.1	-0.2	0.1	0.4
Peri-urban - Intercept	1.0	559	-0.3	0.4	-1.2	-0.2	0.5
Peri-urban - Social Status	1.0	2266	-0.2	0.2	-0.6	-0.2	0.2
Peri-urban - Identity	1.0	1832	-1.1	0.3	-1.6	-1.1	-0.5
Peri-urban - Resentment	1.0	1835	0.9	0.2	0.5	0.9	1.3
Peri-urban - Social Status: Identity Strength	1.0	1837	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.9	1.6
Peri-urban - Social Status : Place-Based Resentment	1.0	1381	-0.6	0.3	-1.2	-0.6	-0.1
Peri-Urban - Place-Based Resentment : Identity Strength	1.0	2245	0.0	0.2	-0.4	0.0	0.4
Peri-Urban - Resentment : Identity Strength : Social Status	1.0	2026	-0.2	0.2	-0.5	-0.2	0.1

Appendix D – Linear Charts for zero-truncated distribution, full information

We run an equivalent linear model for the zero-truncated political trust distribution. Note that the dependent variable is now trust in government, which runs from 1 (low trust) to 10 (high trust). This means that the direction of equivalent relationships in the main analysis in the article is reversed. We expected place-based resentment's effect to be positive in the article, but here we expect it to be negative. The coefficient plots highlight that place-based resentment, and social status, are significant and influence political trust in the expected direction, however the extremely broad margins in the posterior predictions indicate that the 'r-squared', to put it into frequentist terms, is rather low. So, while we can identify the expected effect, our zero-truncated model has very little predictive power. By contrast, the logistic no-trust model can provide relatively confident estimates. This may suggest that there are further distinctions to be drawn between moderate and high trust individuals, or that political trust is a multi-causal process, either possibility would introduce significant noise into the estimate (effectively reducing the r-squared) and assessing either would require further investigation.

Figure D1 - Coefficient Plots

**Posterior Predictions**

Figure D2 - Peri-urban

Figure D3 - Rural

Figure D4 - Urban

Figure D5 – Full Regression Results for Truncated Linear Analysis

Parameter	Rhat	n_eff	mean	sd	2.5%	50%	97.5%
(Intercept)	1.0	1046	4.1	0.3	3.5	4.1	4.7
Left-Right Self Placement	1.0	3775	0.0	0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.2
Age	1.0	2684	-0.2	0.1	-0.4	-0.2	-0.0
Bachelor Degree	1.0	4431	-0.0	0.2	-0.4	-0.0	0.3
Gender (Female = 1)	1.0	4905	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.6
Unemployed	1.0	5812	-0.3	0.4	-1.0	-0.3	0.5
Retired	1.0	2490	0.3	0.2	-0.1	0.3	0.7
Renaissance Vote	1.0	5095	2.4	0.2	2.0	2.4	2.7
Catholic	1.0	4542	0.2	0.1	-0.1	0.2	0.5
Noncitizen	1.0	4836	0.8	0.5	-0.2	0.8	1.7
Administrative ID: Urban	1.0	2737	-0.2	0.2	-0.6	-0.2	0.3
Administrative ID: Peri-Urban	1.0	3199	-0.4	0.2	-0.8	-0.4	-0.0
% 75+ Living Alone	1.0	3402	-0.1	0.1	-0.2	-0.1	0.1
Median Income	1.0	4843	0.1	0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.2
Distance To Doctor	1.0	4428	0.0	0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.2
Urban - Intercept	1.0	742	-0.0	0.2	-0.5	-0.0	0.5
Urban - Social Status	1.0	4108	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.8
Urban - Place-Based Resentment	1.0	2851	-0.4	0.1	-0.6	-0.4	-0.2
Urban - Identity Strength	1.0	1866	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.9
Urban - Social Status : Identity Strength	1.0	3754	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.7
Urban - Social Status : Place-based Resentment	1.0	4301	0.1	0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.3
Urban - Place-based Resentment : Identity Strength	1.0	3219	0.1	0.1	-0.2	0.1	0.3
Urban - Resentment : Identity Strength : Social Status	1.0	3819	0.1	0.1	-0.2	0.1	0.3
Rural - Intercept	1.0	561	0.0	0.2	-0.5	0.0	0.6
Rural - Social Status	1.0	1514	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.7
Rural - Identity Strength	1.0	3786	0.2	0.2	-0.2	0.2	0.6
Rural - Place-Based Resentment	1.0	3435	-0.6	0.1	-0.9	-0.6	-0.4
Rural - Social Status : Identity Strength	1.0	3055	-0.1	0.2	-0.5	-0.1	0.3
Rural - Social Status : Place-Based Resentment	1.0	3823	0.0	0.1	-0.2	0.0	0.3
Rural - Place-Based Resentment : Identity Strength	1.0	2108	0.1	0.2	-0.2	0.1	0.4
Rural - Resentment : Identity Strength : Social Status	1.0	2362	0.1	0.2	-0.2	0.1	0.4
Peri-urban - Intercept	1.0	782	-0.0	0.2	-0.5	-0.0	0.5
Peri-urban - Social Status	1.0	4057	0.3	0.2	-0.0	0.3	0.7
Peri-urban - Identity	1.0	3221	0.3	0.2	-0.1	0.3	0.8
Peri-urban - Resentment	1.0	4386	-0.7	0.2	-1.0	-0.6	-0.3
Peri-urban - Social Status: Identity Strength	1.0	4338	0.1	0.2	-0.4	0.0	0.5
Peri-urban - Social Status : Place-Based Resentment	1.0	3852	-0.0	0.2	-0.3	0.0	0.3
Peri-Urban - Place-Based Resentment : Identity Strength	1.0	3245	0.1	0.2	-0.2	0.1	0.4
Peri-Urban - Resentment : Identity Strength : Social Status	1.0	2677	0.1	0.2	-0.3	0.1	0.5

Appendix E – Random Intercepts

These charts present the posterior densities of the random intercepts included in each of our models. While there are some differences between departments, none are significantly different from the average for France generally.

**Figure E1 – Logistic Regression Random Intercepts**

Figure E2 - Linear Random Intercepts

Appendix F – Crosstabs Between Interaction Terms

For these crosstabs we break our key interaction variables into categories to make interpretation easier. The categories are 'under -1' or more than one standard deviation below the mean, '-1 to 0' less than one standard deviation below the mean, '0 to 1' less than one standard deviation above the mean, and 'over 1' indicating a respondent's answers placed them more than one standard deviation above the mean. The first set of cross tabs compare resentment and social status, the second set compare social status and identity strength, and the third set compare resentment and identity strength.

Figure F1: Resentment and Social Status Cross Tabs Across Subgroup.

Figure F2: Identity Strength and Social Status Cross Tabs Across Subgroup

Figure F3: Identity Strength and Place-based Resentment Cross Tabs Across Subgroup

Rural Respondents

	under -1	-1 to 0	0 to 1	over 1
over 1	9	103	205	80
0 to 1	14	211	314	28
-1 to 0	3	96	99	13
under -1	7	19	25	4

Resentment Categories / Place Identity Strength Categories

Urban Respondents

	under -1	-1 to 0	0 to 1
over 1	13	37	41
0 to 1	33	168	240
-1 to 0	40	272	214
under -1	62	196	157

Resentment Categories / Place Identity Strength Categories

Peri-urban Respondents

	under -1	-1 to 0	0 to 1	over 1
over 1	7	26	22	10
0 to 1	14	103	105	11
-1 to 0	10	109	53	7
under -1	10	30	19	4

Resentment Categories / Place Identity Strength Categories

Appendix H – Ethical Data Collection Considerations

Responses were collected in September and October of 2022, through a typical access panel and respondents were paid a sum of fifteen Euros for participating in the survey. The third-party survey company that collected the data received voluntary and informed consent from all participants, who were informed that they were responding to a survey that was part of a broader research project. The target respondents were French speaking residents of France with access to the internet. The sample is representative in terms of age, gender, education, regions, community size, and social class. Our survey did not deceive respondents or ask them to participate in any political process directly.